Volume 20

Issue 1

4-1916

Dickinson Law Review - Volume 20, Issue 7

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Dickinson Law Review - Volume 20, Issue 7, 20 DICK. L. REV. 195 ().
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol20/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
VOL. XX

APRIL, 1916

EDITORS

No. 7

BUSINESS MA2"AGER8

Clarence G. Shenton
A. F. Miller
James H. Courtney
Henry M. Bruner

Daniel M. Garrahan
John L. Shelley, Jr.
Saul C. Gorson
William F. Farrell

Sub~ecri*,Uon $1.40 per amrsi, vwaable is.aiv£dw

RECITALS IN DEEDS AS EVIDENCE
A recital is an assertion of a fact. The language of the
deed may be dictated by the grantor, and assented to by the
grantee, (and he assents thereto when he accepts the deed)
or dictated by the grantee and assented to by the grantor
(and he assents to it when he executes and delivers the
deed.) These assertions may be of an infinite variety of
facts. A common recital is of earlier conveyances the last
of which is to the grantor'. A deed made in 1849, contained the following recital: "which said tract of land (the land
being conveyed) was patented by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania by patent dated the 2d day of July, 1795, and
enrolled in Patent Book No. 28, page 386, unto a certaii)
John Kantner, and by sundry conveyances became vested
in said Anthony Sharp, deceased, and by virtue of an order
of the Orphans' Court of Lycoming County, sold by public
outcry on the 28th of April, 1849, to said Matthias Baier,
this sale so made was confirmed by said court as by reference to said proceedings will fully appear. ' 2 Besides deeds
from alleged earlier owners, to alleged predecessors of the
'Penrose
v. Griffith, 4 Binn. 231.
2
Dougherty v. Welshans, 233 Pa. 121.
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grantor, a patent from the Commonwealth may be a recited
conveyance or one of the recited conveyances. 3

General Reeital
A general recital that by "sundry conveyances" the
ownership of the land became vested in Anthony Sharp,
was objected to as evidence of conveyances, because it did
not give the names of the parties to the conveyances, nor
In the case of ancient deeds, it
the dates of the deeds.
would be impossible to recognize the necessity of such particularity.
"In many instances," says Elldn, J., "such a
rule would place an impossible burden upon the holder of an
ancient title, and one which might result in the doing of
great injustice. The law only requires the production of
the best evidence possible under the circumstances, and
never demands an impossibility. The rule as to the admission of ancient deeds and papers in evidence is one of necessity and grows out of the recognized difficulty and frequently the impossibility of proving the actual facts connected with old transactions. ' 4
Recital In Patent
The recitals may be not in deeds from private persons,
but in a patent from the State of Pennsylvania. Thus a
patent to Richard Neave and Richard Neave, Jr., issued in
1789, recited a conveyance by the warrantee to Croghan in
June, 1763; by Croghan to Callender in August, 1763; by
Callender to Hughes in May, 1764; by Hughes to Baynton
in Sept., 1764; by Baynton to Barnes, August 1st, 1766; by
Barnes to Baynton and two others; August 2d, 1766, to the
two Neaves.5
3283 Pa. 121.
4Dougherty v. Welshans, 233 Pa. 121.
5Penrose v. Griffith, 4 Binn. 231.
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Recitals of Pedigree
The general statement is made in an early case0 that
the recitals in deeds with respect to pedigree are evidence.
"In deeds," says Sergeant, j.,7 "there are often recitals of
marriages, births, or deaths without issue, and other facts
incident to the conveyance, which on the same principle,
would, after a length of time, be evidence as against third
persons, not claiming by or through the grantor."
Other Facts
A fact often recited or averred, in the form of a receipt on the deed, or otherwise, is that a certain amount of
purchase money has been paid by the grantee to the grantor., Other facts important as affecting title mentioned in
recitals are the following: Proclamation calling Porrock
owner of a piece of land, who has fled from the state to appear in the state for trial for treason (during the revolution) his failure to appear, his attainder in consequence,
the forfeiture of his land, its sale and conveyance by the
A county
Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania2
treasurer's deed of unseated land recites a bond given for a
portion of the price at which it is sold at the tax-sale. 10 A
deed from A to B may recite that another deed between the
same parties was made at the same time for the same land,
and that the reciting deed was made for the purpose of being recorded in Pennsylvania.1 1 A deed from the executor
of H to McK. recited that H in his lifetime was "seised in
his demesne as of fee." McK. subsequently conveyed to A
and A to B, and B to C with warranty. This recital was
evidence in favor of C as against B, that the title was ten
8Morris v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 64.
78 W. & S. 192.
sSalt Manuf. Co. v. Neel, 54 Pa. 9.
9
James v. Letzler, 8 W. & S. 192.
lODeviney v. Reynolds, 1 W. & S. 328.
11
Strawbridge v. Cartledge, 7 W. & S. 394.

198

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW '

years before the conveyance to B, out of the Commonwealth, and that the land was consequently, at that time
subject to taxation and sale for unpaid taxes. 12 Recital in
a deed by A, B, C. etc. children of X, that the land conveyed
1
was part of a tract of which X died seised. "
Recital of Previous Conveyance by Grantor
A deed from A to B may contain a recital of a previous
conveyance by A to C.
In so doing, it shows that the
grantor has no title to pass to B. Tate on February 27th,
1846, delivered a deed to his daughter-in-law, Martha L.
Tate in fee simple. On July 4th, 1846, he conveyed the
same land to Black in trust for Martha L. Tate for life, and
for remainder men. In an ejectment by two of the remaindermen, claiming under the second Tate deed, against
Clement the grantee of Martha L. Tate, it was held that the
deed to Black showed that the plaintiffs had no title.
It
showed that the grantor had, at the time of making it, no
estate in the land to convey,although the same deed mentions that the first deed had, with the consent of both parties to it, been "withdrawn, annulled and cancelled."
"An
estate," says Mitchell, J., "once vested cannot be divested by
the mere annullment and cancellation of the deed."
No
title can be divested by a mere recital in a deed, or by any
form of deed to which the holder of the title is not a party.
A fortiori is this the case where the title sought to be divested is in a married woman and can only be conveyed in
accordance with the prescribed statutory forms."'
1-McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. 115.

Action for breach of war-

ranty.
"3Mehaffey v. Dobbs, 9 W. 363, 367, 379. While as an admission
by A, it was evidence, Gibson, C. J., says its strength is impaired by
the fact that such recitals are usually the work of scriveners.
14Tate v. Clement, 176 Pa. 550. Martha L. Tate had in her deed
to Clement recognized the second deed, by reciting it as the deed
under which she claimed title.
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Evidence Against the Grantor
If a statement is made by any one concerning a fact,
any one else, whose rights as against the maker of it are
dependent on that fact, may, as against such maker, use the
statement as an admission. The statement might be oral
or written; if written, in an unsealed instrument or in a
deed. The grantee may use the recital in the deed to him,
as evidence of the fact recited, in an ejectment against the
The deed describing the land conveyed as "the
grantor.
same premises that were conveyed unto the grantor in this
conveyance by C. W. and L. J. W., his wife, the father and
mother of this grantor by deed dated January 21, 1889, and
recorded in the Recorder's Office in Warren County, Pennsylvania, in deed book 71, page 773," is evidence even conclusive as against the grantor in favor of the grantee that
the deed was delivered. 1" Statements affecting the title to
the premises, made in a deed, by the grantor, may be used
against him, by any one claiming the land under the grantee.
Recital of Payment of PurchaseMoney
Statements in the deed by the grantor, of the payment
of the purchase money, while some, are but slight, evidence
that the money has been paid, in an action for the purchase
money. The acknowledgment in the body of the deed, and
the receipt therein are evidence 0 of the lowest order. It
is every day's practice to have a receipt on the back of the
deed, when perhaps, nine times in ten, there is not a shilling
paid.17 In a suit for breach of the covenant to convey land,
the written agreement stating that the purchase money has
25Muntz v. Whitcombe, 40 Super. 553.
"Kelly v. Dunlap, 3 P. & W. 136.
17Hamilton v. McGuire, 3 S. & R. 355. The defendant (grantee)
himself showed receipts for portion of the purchase money paid subsequently to the date of the deed. Cf. Jordan v. Cooper, 3 S. & R.,
564; Weigley v. Weir, 7 S. & R., 309; Byers v. Mullen, 9 W. 266.
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been paid, the vendor may show that he in fact has not been
paid. "It is very common," says Tilghman, C. J., "in deeds
for the conveyance of land to acknowledge the receipt of the
purchase money in the body of the deed, and also in a separate receipt at the bottom, or on the back of it, though no
money has been paid but only secured to be paid by bond or
otherwise.
But, whenever the grantee has attempted to
avail himself of these receipts, the grantor has been permitted to show that the money was not paid."18 Although the
deed mentions $1000 as the consideration, and at its foot
has a receipt therefor. this is only prima facie evidence that
no other consideration is to be paid. It may be shown that
the real consideration is an interest in other land, passing
from the grantee to the grantor, and that no money was
contemplated.29 The consideration mentioned in the deed
being $5.00, it may be shown that an additional consideration was the grantee's release of the grantor from a debt
of several thousands of dollars. "It was clearly competent
for the plaintiff to show an additional consideration to that
mentioned in the deed, provided it was not directly repugnant to and inconsistent with the one mentioned in it.20
But this qualification seems irrelevant. If the mention of a
consideration may be contradicted, what repugnancy can
there be, which will justify the exclusion of proof of another consideration? The validity of the deed is not to be
attacked by denying the payment of the consideration but,
when for some other purpose the actual consideration is important, it may be inquired into. At the end of a deed, immediately above the signatures, was the clause, "however
subject to the payment of $5915, the purchase money." At
the foot of the deed was a receipt in the usual form, but
without date for the sum of $5915, "in full of the consider'sWatson v. Blaine, 12 S. & R.131.
29Nichols v. Nichols, 133 Pa. 438; Cf. Hoffman v. Strohecker, 9
W. 183; Byers v. Mullen, 9 W. 266.
20
Strawbridge v. Cartledge, 7 W. & S. 394.
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ation named in the above indenture." This was signed by
the grantor. In an equitable ejectment to enforce payment
of the consideration money, Trunkey, J., observes, "The
formal receipt for the purchase money, being without date,
is presumed to be of the date of the deed, and therefore is
not prima facie evidence that the lien so plainly expressed
was satisfied; it is of no greater value than the acknowledgment of payment of the consideration written in the body
of the deed." The purchasers from the grantee were bound
If
to suspect that the consideration had not been paid.
have
would
they
parties
proper
they had inquired of the
learned whether the money was actually21 paid. "They stand
in the vendor's (the grantee's) shoes.1
Receipt, As Affecting Third Persons
A deed between A and B wherein the grantor acknowledges receipt of the consideration, will be mere hearsay and
inadmissible to affect one who is not a party or privy to A.
A sheriff's sale is made on a judgment which has
been paid. The purchaser thereat has knowledge of the
fact. He acquires no title. But, if he conveys the land
to X, a purchaser for value who has no knowledge that the
judgment was paid, X will have an indefeasible title. His recital in the deed to X will, however not be evidence that X
has paid the consideration before getting knowledge of the
If
land is conveyed by A to B,
defeating fact. 2
in fraud of A's creditors, one of these obtaining
a judgment for his debt, may sell the land, as
still A's and the purchaser's title will be superior
to B's. But, if B conveys the land to C, who pays
a consideration, and has no knowledge of the fraud, C's title
will be unassailable. C however cannot use the acknowledgment and receipt in B's deed to him, as evidence of this
2

'lEichelberger v. Gitt, 104 Pa. 64.
Hoffman v. Stiohcker, 9 W. 183.
2
sRogers v. Hall, 4 W. 359.
22
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payment. 23 Generally, when B acquires land from A whose
title is defective, but the defect cannot be urged against B
unless he was not a bona fide purchaser for value, the burden is on him to prove that he paid value before notice of the
defect, and he cannot use the acknowledgment and receipt
in A's deed, as evidence.2
After work was done by a contractor, who had no mechanic's lien for the price, an act
was passed, giving him such a lien. The owner who caused
the erection, had already conveyed the land to X.
The
validity of the act, as against X, depended on his not having paid the consideration, before the act was passed. The
receipt in the deed to X of the payment of the consideration,
would not be sufficient evidence. 25 Gibson, C. J., said that
the acknowledgment and receipt were "incompetent evidence of payment against the third person" and rebuttable
even between the original parties. A, a purchaser at a tax
sale of unseated land, conveys it, within the period of redemption to B. If B has not paid the consideration, and
was ignorant of the facts which made A's purchase equivalent simply to a redemption, he can claim the land, otherwise not. The burden will be upon him to prove, otherwise
than by means of the acknowledgment in A's deed, that he
has paid the consideration. Says Lewis, J., "The receipt in
the body of the deed, or at the foot of it, is sufficient evidence to give effect to the conveyance as against the vendor; but it is no evidence to extinguish the title of a third
person on the ground that the vendee is a purchaser without notice of such third person's right. W. Canal Co. v.
Young, 1 Whart. 432; Bolton v. Johns, 5 Barr. 151.
To
entitle Mr. Sartwell to assume the position of a purchaser
without notice, he must prove, independently of the receipt
of the grantor in the deed, that he actually paid the consideration before notice of the plaintiff's equity. ' 26 Land pur24

Union Canal Co. v. Young, 1 Whart. 410.
v. Johns, 5 Pa. 145.
0Coxe v. Sartwell, 21 Pa. 480.

25
Bolton
2
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chased by A is after his death, conveyed to B, a son. The
son holds it subject to a trust as to two-thirds for the two
other children of A. If B has conveyed the land to C, the
trust can be enforced against C, unless he was a purchaser
for value from B. The receipt in B's deed to him, will not
be evidence to prove payment of the purchase money. It is
oath, taken without
a mere ex parte declaration, not under
27
any opportunity to cross examine.
Affirmation of Part of a Recital, Denial of Another Part
It is not necessary that one who uses a recital, as affirming the truth should concede the correctness
of the whole of it. In an ejectment by A against B, it was
necessary to show that B who with others, had been owners of the tract, had conveyed it to persons who had conveyed it to X who had devised it to A. B with others had
conveyed the same land to C, by deed reciting that the land,
after several conveyances, had "become the property" of X;
that X had died possessed of it without having paid the
ground rents; and that in consequence of this neglect, the
owners of the rents, by virtue of a condition in the conveyances to the predecessors of X, had re-entered, and sold the
premises to M. It was permissible to A to employ so much
of the recital as alleged conveyances whereby the premises
became the property of X, without conceding the truth of
the other part of the recital which averred a condition subsequent, the breach thereof, and a re-entry. Says Tilghman,
C. J., "These recitals are only evidence, and no estoppel to
the plaintiff, who does not claim under the deed in which
they are contained. What a man says against himself may
be taken for true against himself, and those claiming under
him; but there is not the same force in his declarations in
his own favor. The plaintiff therefore was at liberty to
deny that the proprietors had made a re-entry in the man27Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. 419.
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ner required by law for taking advantage of a forfeiture.

23

Grantees Affected By Recitals
'When the grantee in a deed which contains a recital, in
turn conveys to another, the recital becomes evidence in
favor of the second grantee, against the first grantee, thus
become grantor.
The executors of H conveyed his land
to McK.
Their deed averred that H was, by virtue of
divers conveyances, in his lifetime lawfully seised in his
demesne as of fee of and in the land conveyed.
McK, conveyed to a corporation, the corporation conveyed to Harmon, Harmon conveyed to W., W. conveyed to McGrew,
McGrew conveyed to Warner. Warner was evicted from a
portion of the land in consequence of a tax sale, and was
indemnified by McGrew.
McGrew sues Harmon on the
warranty contained in Harmon's deed to W. Was the sale
valid?
Not unless at the time of the imposition of the
tax, the title to the land was out of the commonwealth. It
was held that McGrew could use the recital in the deed from
the executors of H to McK., as an admission, and the court
found that the title was out of the commonwealth. "The
recital," says Noyes, P. J., "is undoubtedly evidence against
the grantors in the deed, and all their successors in title.
It is not conclusive, amounting to an estoppel, except as
against themselves and their privies and in favor of persons
in privity with them."2 9 When a deed from A to B recites
an earlier conveyance from A to X, a result of which would
by that, at the time of his conveying to B, A had no title, a
party claiming the land in ejectment from B, by virtue of
the sale for taxes may avail himself of this recital.
The
recital was of a conveyance by A to the American Stave
and Lumber Co. It did not appear that this company was
incorporated, nor whether it was a partnership or unincorporated association. Therefore, says the court, legal title
did not pass to the company by the recited deed.a
2
sStoever v. Whitman, 6 Binn. 416.
29McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. 115.
aAfrica v. Trexler, 232 Pa. 493.
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Grantor'sStatement In Different Deed
The grantor A in a deed to B, may make a second deed
for the same land, to C. Those claiming under B may use
the recital in the 2d deed, of the making of the first deed,
as evidence that the first deed had been made.30 If A conveys to B, and B to C, and C conveys the land to A, in a
deed, reciting the previous conveyance from A, and subsequently, A conveys the land to D, who has no notice of his
having earlier transferred the land, D will not be affected
with recitals in C's deed back to A, of the conveyance from
A to B, and from B to C, the conveyance from A to B not
being recorded, and D having no notice of it. That is, a
conveyance from A to B being invalid, as against a subsequent conveyance from A to D, who had no actual or constructive notice of the deed from A to B, recitals in the
deed back to A, showing that he had previously owned the
land and had conveyed it, are not evidence against D."
Strangers To The Grantor
A statement in a deed is evidence, against a subsequent
2
grantee from the same grantor, but not against strangers.
A claims land, under a sheriff's sale on an execution against
X. In an ejectment to obtain possession, defendant alleged
that prior to the sale, X and wife had conveyed the land to
Z, and that Z had immediately conveyed it to X and wife,
making them tenants by the entireties, and that X had died
the wife surviving, who had conveyed to him the defendant.
The sheriff's vendee of X's interest is to be treated as a
stranger, until it is shown that X actually made the conveyance with his wife, to Z. This could not be proved by
a recital in a deed from Z to X's wife. Had X in any way
3

oStoever v. Whitman, 6 Binn. 416.
tSchuylkill, etc. Improvement Co. v. McCreary, 58 Pa. 304.
2Salt Co. v. Neel, 54 Pa. 9; Olfsheskey v. Graham, 46 Super. 523;
Penrose v. Griffith, 4 Binn. 231; Dean v. Connelly, 6 Pa. 239; Garwood v. Dennis, 4 Binn. 314, 326; James v. Letzler, 8 W. & S. 192.
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recognized the conveyance from Z to himself and wife, the
case might be different.3
Previous Grantees
A grantor's statement in a deed, cannot be used as evi4
A
dence against his grantee in an earlier conveyance.
owns land subject to an undisclosed trust in favor of X. A
conveys it to B, the deed reciting payment by B of the
consideration. In a suit by X to enforce the trust against
B, A's statement in the deed to B, that B had paid the consideration, is not evidence against X., Perhaps one claiming land by a sheriff's sale of it as A's, is to be treated as a
purchaser from the time of the rendition of the judgment.
on which the sale took place. If, after the judgment, the
defendant makes a deed of confirmation wherein he recites
a deed, earlier than the judgment, this recital will not be
received in a proceeding for the recovery of possession by
the purchaser at the execution sale. Although he.is a grantee of the land subsequent to the deed of confirmation his
right relates back to the recovery of the judgment lien.6
Coulter, J., implies that the purchaser at the execution sale
is a stranger to the deed of confirmation, which "would
seem to have been designed to defeat that judgment."
Recitals As Affecting Third Persons
The general rule says Elkin, J., is that recitals in a
deed are evidence against the grantor and all persons
claiming under him, but are not evidence against a stranger
or other person claiming under a title derived from the
This rule
grantor before the deed containing the recital.
which applies to recent conveyances has a well established
exception in the case of an ancient deed. Recitals in anaMeals v. Brandon, 16 Pa. 220.
4Salt Co. v. Neel, 54 Pa. 9; Olfsheskey v. Graham, 46 Super. 523;
Morris v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 64; Dougherty v. Welshans, 233 Pa. 121.
sLloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. 419.
6Dean v. Connelly, 6 Pa. 239.
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cient deeds, where possession accompanies the deed are
p~bia facie evidence of the facts recited even against third
persons. The trial (of an ejectment) was possibly in 1910.
The defendant claimed under a tax sale. The plaintiff
showing a warrant to S and a patent to K, failed to show a
conveyance from K, and finally to Sharp. He exhibited, however, a deed from Sharp's administratrix, to Baier, which recited a passing of title by
"sundry conveyances" to Sharp, not specifying them. The
Baler deed was made in 1849, and was therefore ancient.
During the years following 1849, Sharp and the claimants
under him have had actual or constructive possession of the
land. "They have exercised dominion over the land to the
exclusion of others, and have borne their share of the public burdens by the payment of taxes assessed against it. No
one else has done any of these things. Surely under such
circumstances a conveyance to Anthony Sharp under whom
the Dougherties claim, will be presumed."7 A conveyance
of Porrick's land was made by the Supreme Executive
Council, in 1778. In an ejectment the question was whether the facts warranted a sale of Porrock's land.
These
facts were that he had left the state, being accused of treasonable acts. He had been called by proclamation into the
state to stand trial, and had failed to appear. A deed from
the University of Pennsylvania to X, for a different piece
of land, reciting these facts concerning Parrock, was offered in evidence.
There had been possession under the
deed of the Supreme Executive Council, more than 50 years.
The recital was evidence of the facts recited., Land was
A's, and descended to her issue, unless she had conveyed it
in her lifetime.
It is alleged that she and her
7

Dougherty v. Welshans, 233 Pa. 121.

Nothing is said about

possession or payment of taxes by others than Kantner, prior to
1849.
"James v. Letzler, 8 W. & S. 192. The deed of the University
was made in 1785. The proclamation calling Porrock in to the state,
was issued in May, 1778. The trial was in 1843.
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husband made a deed to C, who, the next day,
conveyed back to the husband.
These deeds made
in 1761 are lost. A deed made in 1763 by X to
Y, Z, etc., for different land, recited a conveyance from A
and husband to C, and from C back to the husband. The
husband lived until 1797, and had possession, but he would
have had a right to it by the curtesy, even if the conveyance
to him had not occurred. The trial of the ejectment, took
The recital being in an ancient
place in possibly 1810.
deed, although by a stranger to the title of A, was evidence
of A's alleged conveyance to C. Though the husband's possession observes Tilghman, C. J., may not have been in consequence of the deed, yet there never has been any possession against it. It derives considerable weight from antiquity, but not so much as if it had been the sole explanation
of the husband's possession.
The justice notes that the
recital was offered as a corroboratingcircumstance of the
existence of the recited deed, a foundation, satisfactory to
the court, having been laid both of its existence and loss.
The persons making the recitals, are those likely to know
the facts and whose interest it was that no such deed
should have existedY
Contradictionof Recitals
Except when a party has a right to rely and has relied
on the truth of the recital, and to contradict it would involve him in less, it is considered simply as evidence, and
can be contradicted. Even a recital of a fact in A's deed to
B, which would probably influence B in deciding to purchase, may be shown to be false, without exposing A to the
consequences of fraud. Gibson, C. J., remarks that recitals
are often the work of the scrivener. They are not evidence
gGarwood v. Demis, 4 Binn. 314.
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of actual fraud.1 0 A makes a deed for a piece of land except a certain part of it stated in the deed to have been
purchased by the city of Lancaster. A's executor, suing for
the excepted piece may deny the truth of the statement that
it had been sold to Lancaster, and may by evidence
support the denial.11 Bower owning land in 1831 conveyed
it to Olwine excepting from it certain lots the title to which
is "now vested in other persons," (not named). The heirs
of Bower, possibly in 1856, bring ejectment for these lots,
denying the truth of the statement that the title was in
other persons. Although the exception prevented the title's
passing to Olwine, it did not cause it to pass, nor did it estop
from denying that it had passed, to the defendant, who
1 - The defendant was,
nevertheless had been in possession.
observes Knox, J., "neither a party nor a privy to the deed
and none other can take advantage of an estoppel." A conveys to B land by deed dated October 16th, 1834, and which
is shown dehors to have been executed and delivered on
that day. Five days afterwards, viz., Oct. 21st, an agreement is made by B to reconvey, "the land he Simpson (A)
sells me this day." It may be proven despite this recital of
the day of conveyance, that the conveyance really took place
five days before, so that the agreement to recovery was
not a mre defeasance of the deed made five days previousSergeant, J., remarks "the plaintiff is not estopped
ly.
from showing that these words were mistakenly introduced,
nor is the jury estopped from finding the truth. * * * * * *
The whole evidence in this case tended to show that in fact
the deed was executed and delivered on the 16th and that
loGood v. Good, 9 W. 567. The recital was that there was no
dower in the land. The widow subsequently recovered dower from
The question was as to the measure of damages.
the grantee.
Without fraud the stipulated price would be the standard value of
compensation. Cf. Bicking's Appeal, 2 Breust. 202.
'iMuhlenberg v. Druckenmiller, 103 Pa. 631. A stranger to the
deed could not object to the denial.
l2Miller v. Halman, 2 Phila. 118.
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the agreement of the 21st was a distinct and unconnected
matter."13
Grantee In a Deed Poll
Apparently, the principle that a grantee is to be treated as adopting recitals in the deed, so as to make them evidence against him or those claiming under him, is not applicable unless the deed is an indenture. Poyntell conveyed
by deed poll, a piece of land to Spencer. The deed recited
a warrant granted in 1800 to W. M. the land allotted under
which W. M. by indenture conveyed to Poyntell, father of
the grantor.
Spencer, when receiving the conveyance,
gave a mortgage for purchase money to the grantor. In a
scire facias on this mortgage against Spencer's administrator, the defense was want of title in Poyntell to the Iand
Gibson, C. J., held that the recital in the deed-poll "not being the words of the grantee, was not evidence to affect
him." Had the mortgage contained a similar recital, being
the language of the grantee, become mortgagor, it would
have been evidence of the title in Poyntell.
The distinction between indenture and deed poll is very fragile. When
B accepts a deed, naming him as grantee, and claims under
it does he not as distinctly adopt its language as when he
signs it? Since Spencer claimed under Poyntell, and obtained possession from him, why it was necessary for Poyntell to trace his title from the commonwealth, is not apparent. Why should he keep the land unless he paid for it according to the contract under which he obtained possession?
23Kelly v. Thompson, 7 W. 401. A recital of a fact in a deed
from A to B, is deemed notice of that fact to B, from the time of
his acceptance of the deed. Mulholland's Estate, 224 Pa. 536. He
cannot successfully assert that he first learned of the fact later.

14Poyntell v. Spencer, 6 Pa. 254.
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MOOT COURT
HARRISON v. JENKS
Contract-Infancy-Ratificaion
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jenks, a minor, 18 years old, inherited from his father a tract
of land on which was a mortgage for $4000. The mortgagee undertook to foreclose the mortgage, and Jenks, unable to raise the money,
appealed to Harrison, his father's friend, who agreed to advance the
money. The mortgagee refused to assign the mortgage, and Harrison asked Jenks to make a mortgage to him thinking that Jenks
would ratify the mortgage vhen he reached his majority. Jenks,
now 23, being sued on the mortgage, sets up his infancy when he made it. The original mortgage was marked satisfied
on the record, when Jenks paid it with the money obtained from

Harrison.
Gillespie, for the plaintiff.
Malcolm, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BURKE, J. It is an elementary principle in the law of contracts that the contracts of an infant are voidable; 5 Elliot on Contracts 798; 16 A. & E. Enc. 283; and that after attaining majority
he may either ratify or disaffirm them. The question which presents itself in the case at bar is whether Jenks, in the consideration of the law, has ratified the mortgage which he made when he
was eighteen years of age. There is nothing in the facts to lead us
to believe that prior to this action, he either ratified or disaffirmed.
The Supreme Court held in the case of Logan v. Gardner, 136
Pa. 588, that "the weight of authority now is that the deed of an infant is voidable only, that the title passes by it, and will remain
in the grantee, until some clear act of disaffirmance by the grantor
after coming of age; and that such deed may be affirmed by acts,
much less formal than would be required to avoid it, and clearly by
an estoppel." In the case at bar there seems to be no act that would
tend to show an affirmance, nor are there any circumstances which
would create an estoppel.
Williams, J., in the case of Dolph- v. Hand, 156 Pa. 91, said:
"If one who has the right to elect or disaffirmn does not exercise it
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within a reasonable time, but with full knowledge of his privilege,
omits or neglects to assert it, his omission may fairly be regarded
as the equivalent of an act of affirmance, and as amounting in
fact and in law to a ratification." It is evident from this case that a
reasonable time must elapse before the defendant will be barred
from disaffirming his mortgage. In the case at bar, has a reasonable time elapsed since the defendant attained majority? The
Supreme Court in dealing with this question, held in the case of
Grimes v. Urban, 2 Grant 96, that fourteen years was not an unreasonable time. In the absence of circumstances which would
lead to an estoppel, we think that the defendant has not had a
reasonable time in which to decide whether to disaffirm, or to ratify
his mortgage.
In the case of Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553, the court held that
"a person purchasing real estate of an infant knowing the fact, and
especially the father, must and ought to take the risk of an avoidance of the contract by the infant, after arriving at majority."
In
the case at bar, Harrison was a friend of Jenks' father, and knew
that Jenks was a minor. The same case also held that "mere acquiesence for three years after arriving at age without any affirmative act was not a ratification." In the case under discussion, Jenks
has been of age only two years. The fact that Jenks did not manifest his intention to disaffirm within two years, if he had such intention during that time, does not bar him from pleading his infancy in this action, inasmuch as Harrison knew that upon becoming
of age Jenks could disaffirm the mortgage. Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa.
331; Wood v. Wilson, 37 Pa. 379.
In view of the fact that an infant is allowed by law a reasonabl.
time within which to disaffirm his contract, and since only two years
have elapsed in this case, with no circumstances that would estop the
defendant from disaffirming, we give judgment for the defendant.
Loan Association v. Arvin, 207 Pa. 293; Smith v. Eisenlord, 2 Phila.
353.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
We cannot think that the decision of the learned court below
effectuates justice.
There was a valid mortgage on Jenks' land for $4,000 which it
was the intention of the mortgagee to foreclose. Had he done so,
the land would have been lost to Jenks. In order to obviate this disaster, Jenks agreed to give a mortgage to Harrison for the same amount,
if he would discharge the existing mortgage which its owner refused
to assign. Harrison paid the existing mortgage, and accepted a new
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mortgage. He thus secured the land to Jenks, subject to a mortgage
for the purchase money. Jenks retains the land after reaching his
majority. Can he do this, without affirming and ratifying the mortgage? We think not. If B, a minor buys anything, a piece of land,
a horse, a carriage, at a price which he does not pay, why should he
be permitted to keep it, after becoming 21 years old, without paying
for it? The retention of it, after demand for payment, is a ratification or confirmation of the purchase, and of his undertaking to
pay the price. "If an infant purchases property, and in pursuance
of the contract, gives a purchase money mortgage upon it, he cannot
avoid the mortgage without also avoiding the purchase and restoring
the property." Williston's Wald's Pollock on Contracts: p. 69, note;
Berry v. Stigall, 253 Mo. 690; 162 S. W. 126; 37 Amer. & Eng. Ann.
Cases, p. 118. Jenks owned the fee subject to a mortgage. He gets
rid of the mortgage by giving another mortgage. He cannot retain
the exemption from the first mortgage, and repudiate the second mortgage which was the price of it. Nor is it, we think, necessary to
resort to the hypothesis of subrogation to the first mortgage. The
second mortgage, being for the same amount as the money paid to
extinguish the first mortgage, may, with equal equity, be enforced.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

BRANTLEY v. RANDALL
Agency-Undisclosed Principal-Contract Under Seal
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brantley employed Magee to sell his farm. Randall had employed Williams to buy the farm, Magee and Williams executed the
contract in their own names, each signing opposite the printed letters "L. S." Brantley was known by Williams to be the owner of
the farm, but his name was not mentioned in the contract. Williams
was financially irresponsible.
This is assumpsit for the value of the bargain, $500. The agreement omitted the words "witness my hand and seal," but Williams
contends that an undisclosed principal cannot be sued on a sealed
instrument, nor can such a one sue on such an instrument. Brantley contends that the instrument is not a sealed one as it contains
no reference to the seal; also that the seal may be ignored as surplusage. Suit is brought within one year of the making of the
agreement. Magee had written authority to sign the agreement, but
not under seal. Williams has only verbal authority to buy.
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Savidge, for the plaintiff.
Smith, Ed., for the defendant.
McCARTHY, J. The principals in this ease, the parties to the
suit, have employed agents to execute a contract for the sale of a
farm worth $500. The selling agent had written authority, and the
Now.
purchasing agent had verbal authority to sign the agreement.
there is a principle of law which says that the appointment of an
agent must be of as high and solemn a character as the act to be done
by the agent. In other words an agent cannot act under seal unless
he has been authorized to do so by an instrument under seal. 1 Elliott on Contracts, See. 452, page 666; Gordon v. Buaokeley, 14 S. &
R. 331. It appears that the agents have violated this rule, and now
we must consider the nature of this agreement; that is, whether they
have made 'a simple contract or executed a -sealed instrument.
It is needless to go into a lengthy discussion of the law of seals.
It is enough to say that modern business methods require the process to -be as simple as possible, and the courts have repeatedly
held that a mere scroll or the printed letters "L. S.," if signed opposite by the parties, constitute a seal. 35 Cye. 1171; Loran v. Niesley, 156 Pa. 329. The presence or absence of the words "witness my
hand and seal" is not the important thing in determining whether
an instrument is sealed or not. The act of signing opposite the letters "L. S." is the criterion. 35 Cyc. 1173; Taylor v. Gaser, 2 S. &
R. 504.
We fear that the counsel for the plaintiff has misconstrued the
meaning of Judge Mitchell's statement in Bennett v. Allen, 10 Pa.
C. C. 257. It is clear that the agents have executed a sealed instrument, and have not mentioned the names of their principals therein.
We must now consider the rights of the parties to the agreement,
and also the rights of the principals.
In 1 Elliott on Contracts, See. 464, page 694, we have found that
"an agent binds himself personally when he fails to disclose that he
is acting as an agent. The same is true where an agent fails to disclose the identity of his principal." See also 31 Cyc. 1555; 18 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 692; Welch v. Goodwin, 123 Mass. 71; Bartlett v. Raynond, 139 Mass. 275. It must be the mutual intention of the parties
that the agent was not to be bound, before the undisclosed principal can be held. 31 Cyc. 1555; Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. (Mass.)
374; Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, holds, "A contract under seal
for the sale of lands, executed by an agent in his own name, without referring to his principal, cannot be enforced against the latter." We have shown that the agent may be held under the sealed instrument in this case.
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This brings us to the rule that a contract if valid without a
seal may ignore the seal and be good as a simple contract, in which
case an undisclosed principal may sue. But the case of Nicoll v.
Burke, 78 N. Y. 580, prevents the operation of this rule. We will
quote verbatim. "In order to take a case out of the general rule
where the contract is one which is valid without a seal, and the
seal is therefore of no account, it must appear that the contract
was really ma'de on behalf of the principal from the instrument,
and that the party derived benefit from and accepted and confirmed it by acts on his part." See also Briggs v. Partridge,
supra, and Smith v. Pierce, 45 App. Div. N. Y. 628.
Although we have been unable to find any Pennsylvania courts
upholding this doctrine, we "think this is the law that should govern cases of this kind. It makes principals be cautious in the selection of agents; arid likewise compels agents to be careful in
the performance of their duties.
The agents have executed a contract which cannot be enforced by the principals. In accordance with the law laid down
we are compelled to non-suit the plaintiff as asked by the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The crucial question in this ease is whether the instrument executed by Magee and Williams is, for the purposes of the present
action, to be regarded as a sealed instrument.
If it is not to be so regarlded, then, applying well settled
rules, it follows that Brantley, the vendor was entitled to recover
the value of his bargain. 31 Cyc. 1574, 1598, 11 Dickinson Law
Review 201.
It seems, however, to be well settled, and, indeed, it has not
been seriously disputed in this case that the letters L. S. whether
alone or enclosed -by brackets or parentheses, are a proper substitute for a common law seal, and that the fact that an instrument bearing these letters contains no recital or reference to the
fact that it was sealed, does not change its character as a sealed
instrument. 11 Ann. Cas. 250; 19 Ann Cas. 674; Long v. Ramsey, 1 S. & R. 72; Lorah v. Neisley, 156 Pa. 329; Wenchell v. Steph.
ens, 30 Super. 533; Bank v. Kintz, 24 Super. 456; Taylor v. Glaser, 2
S. & R. 502.
The instrument being therefore a sealed Instrument, an undisclosed principal could not sue or be sued thereon unless, as contended by the plaintiff, the seals, being unnecessary to give legal
efficacy to the instrument, may be disregarded. 31 Cyc. 1576, 1600.
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The contention of the plaintiff finds support in Lancaster v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 153 Pa. 432, in which the court said, "It
is text book law applietd and enforced in a long and unbroken
line of cases, that where a simple contract other than a bill or
note, is made by an agent in his own name, his undisclosed principal may maintain an action, or be sued, upon it. It is also well
settled that an authorized and unnecessary addition of a seal to
such an instrument may be treated as surplusage."
The seals attached to the contract in the present case were
both unnecessary and unauthorized. 31 Cyc. 1231, Encyc. L. & P.
805; Schmertz v. Schreese, 62 Penna. 460; Jones v. Homer, 60
Pa. 218; Gordon v. Bulokeley, 14 S. & R. 331; Cooper v. Rankin,
5 Binn. 613; Baum v. Duboes, 43 Pa. 265.
The judgment is therefore reversed.
COMMONWEALTH v. SCANNELL
Constitutional Law-Involuntary Servitude - 13th and 14th Amendments-Breach of Contract Criminalized
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statute makes the failure of a man, who has contracted to
work for a definite time for another, by abandoning the work before
the expiration of that time, a misdemeanor.
Scannell contracted
with X as a farm laborer for a season of thirteen weeks. At the end
of two weeks he deserted.
He is indicted. He alleges that the
statute is unconstitutional.
Rorer, for Commonwealth.
Savige, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROYAL, J. The statute under which this prosecution is brought
apparently represents, in so far as it is possible to translate correctly the baffling intentions of our state legislatures, an attempt to prevent the breach of a contract for work for a definite time by a threat
of punishment by the state. It evidently goes upon the theory that
the employer is the party to the contract to be favored with this additional aid to the enforcement of contracts, or remedy for their
breach after undertaken. His civil right in an action of assumpsit
is considered as inadequate, and the threat of such a proceeding as
insufficient to prevent the party contracting to work, from abandoning the work before the expiration of the definite time for which he
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has contracted. The defendant in this prosecution, having entered
into a contract to work for a term of thirteen weeks, after working
two weeks of that period, deserted.
Being indicted under this
statute, he alleges its unconstitutionality, and alleges it with excellent cause, we believe.
As far as we are able to discover, no state in the Union has
passed an act exactly similar to this. But there have been acts of
somewhat the same nature, and they have uniformly been declared
unconstitutional upon one ground or another. And it is upon these
decisions that we base our conclusion that the present statute is likewise unconstitutional.
This act of the legislature is in direct violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which reads, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the U. S. or any place subject to their jurisdiction." To compel a
party to remain at his work when he has contracted for a definite
time, by a threat of criminal prosecution, is to make him do that
which he has a perfect right to refuse to do. True, refusal may
be followed by a civil suit by the aggrieved party, but the state does
not step in and declare the breach of contract a crime. "The word
servitude is of larger meaning than the word slavery as it is popularly understood in this country." Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace
36, (1872). It has been held to include all cases where a person is
forced against his will to render personal services for another.
It
exists in this case, as the able counsel for the defendant contends,
the moment one who has contracted to render personal services in
connection with the private business of another, is obliged against
his will to continue in such service.
It has been declared that a statute which punishes as a crime
the failure of a man to perform a contract for farm labor, previously
having received advances in money or supplies, is in violation of the
13th amendment and therefore unconstitutional. See Ex parte Drayton, 153 Fed. 986 (1907); Ex parte Holman, 60 S.E. 19, a South Carolina case of 1908. Neither can such an act be upheld under guise
of an exercise of the police power of the state. See Ex parte Dray.
ton, supra. "The police power is subject to the Constitution and cannot be used as a cloak for legislation which impairs rights or unduly restricts liberties guaranteed by it." In State v. Julow, 129 Mo.
163; 31 S. W. 781; (1895), it is said: "A statute cannot escape censure by assuming the label of a police regulation. This statute has
none of the elements which pertain to such a regulation, for it does
not in terms or by implication, promote or tend to promote, the public health, welfare or safety; and if it did, the state would not be
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allowed under the guise of a police regulation, to encroach or trample upon any of the just rights of the citizen which the constitution
intended to secure against diminution or abridgment." The statute
in this instance was not one similar to that under discussion, but the
opinion is quoted as presenting a clear statement on the subject of
the police power. The act under which Scannell is indicted certainly cannot be defended on the ground of a proper regulation by police power.
Surely if a statute intended to punish those who refuse to perform reasonable services which they have contracted for, and for
which they have received advances, (Ex parte Holmes, and Ex parte
Drayton, supra), then a fortiori, a law which seeks to invoke the aid
of the state by criminal punishment for failure'to continue work contracted for at a definite time, irrespective of advances, is likewise unconstitutional as in contradiction to the 13th amendment.
The first statute attempts to deal with a man who is more worthy
of censure than the second, for he has received advances, but the statute is unconstitutional nevertheless. So, also, acts which have been
designed to punish parties who have contracted for another, or rent
premises, and after entering upon the same, and before the expiration of the contract, shall make a second contract with a third party
without notice of the original contract being given to the third party,
such statutes have been declared unconstitutional as in violation of
the 13th amendment, involving involuntary servitude. State v. Armstead, 60 South. 778, a Mississippi Supreme Court case of 1913. Also Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120; 37 South. 322. The doctrine laid
down in this last case was stated and approved by Justice Hughes of
the United States Supreme Court in connection with another case involving an act of similar purport. He says: "It is the compulsion
of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs, the
condition of servitude is created. The fundamental purpose was to
compel under the sanction of the criminal law, the enforcement of the
contract for personal services." See 219 U. S.219, (1911).
The statute under which Scannell is indicted is exactly similar
to the one discussed in the cases last cited, with the exception that a
second contract is entered into by the offending party. Is this not
worse than Scannell's act? It involves a wrong to a third party;
the scope of the misfeasance is wider, and yet the act tending to punish the guilty party is unconstitutional. A fortiori, so is the present
law.
While it would be sufficient for the purposes of this proceeding,
to find the statute unconstitutional under one provision of the Federal
constitution, we add that it is our belief that the present statute is
also in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Thir-
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teenth, in that it denies the equal protection of the laws. One of the
parties to the contract is deprived' of one of his fundamental rights,
namely, the right to terminate a contract as others may.
This
right cannot be abridged in this manner. See Gillespie v. People,
188 Ill. 176; 58 N. E. 1007, (1900); Zillmer v. Freutzberg, 114 Wisc.
530; 90 N. W. 1008, (1908); State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; 31 S. W.
781, (1895). The statute does not bear equally on the employer and
employee, the latter alone being punishable for refusal to continue
his part of the bargain. This plainly contravenes the clause of the
first section of the 14th amendment which forbids any state to pass
a law denying the equal protection of the laws to citizens within its
jurisdiction. "The parties to a contract are entitled to equal sanction of the law for the protection and enforcement of their rights under it." Ex parte Holman, 60 S. E. 19, (1908). Equal protection of
the laws means "that all persons should have like access to the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and
Barbier v.
redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts."
Connolly, 113 U. S.27, (1885).
Statutes providing for the enforcement of a party's agreement
to render service in discharge of debt, have been held unconstitutional as violating the 13th amendment. See Clyatt v. U. S., 197
U. S.207. The criminal law cannot be used to compel a man to keep
his contract. He has a right to terminate it, subject to a suit by the
aggrieved party in an action of assumpsit. The mere subterfuge of
attempting to call a statute like the one under discussion, an example of the police power, will also not avail. The statute under which
Scannell was indicted is unconstitutional, and that quite clearly, we
believe, It is not an act to punish fraudulent practices, either.
The question of fraud does not concern us.
There remains but one more point. Counsel for the Commonwealth has relied mainly upon Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S.275,
where an act of Congress punishing deserting seamen, was held constitutional. But this case cites a clear exception, and there is no
analogy to the present case. In fact, Justice Brown in his opinion
makes this very plain. He says: "A breach of a contract for personal
service has not been recognized in this country as involving liability
to criminal punishment, EXCEPT in the case of sailors and soldiers."
We regard this decision as favoring the contention of the defendant.
rather than the side maintained by the learned counsel for the commonwealth.
In view of the foregoing conclusions, we hold the statute under
which Scannell was indicted, to be unconstitutional.
Decisions upholding this view and a deep reluctance to see the attempts of the
legislatures to violate both the letter and the spirit of the Consti-
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tution, by subterfuges and tricks, bring us to this conclusion.
The
party aggrieved by breach either before or after the commencement
of a contract for work, whether for a definite or indefinite time,
(though the former case is stronger), to our mind has ample redress
and protection with his civil remedies. Furthermore there is no reason why he should be favored by the aid of the criminal law, more than
the party who contracts to work. The employer is of no more importance in the eyes of the law than the employee, nor is it.necessary
to invoke the criminal law for his aid, and his alone.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has decided that the statute for the
violation of which the defendant is indicted, is unconstitutional. In
his opinion the plain purpose, the necessary operation, the obvious"
effect of the statute, is to compel under the sanction of the criminal
law the performance of a contract for personal services, and therefore
the statute is violative of article thirteen of the amendments to the
Constitution of the United States which declares, "neither slavery or
involuntary servitude, exeept as a punishment for crime, whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United
States."
In support of his decision he has adduced authorities. So great
is the number of the cases which support the position which the learned court below has taken, and of such respectability are the courts
which have decided them, that we are constrained to affirm the decision in this case.
It must not, however, be inferred that in so doing we give our
entire approbation to the reasoning upon which the decisions in these
cases, and the decision of the learned court below, are based.
The theory of these decisions seems to be that what the state
may not do directly it may not do indirectly; that if the statute in
these cases had authorized the employer to seize the employee and
compel him to perform the contract its invalidity would not be questioned; that it is equally clear that the state could not authorize its
constabulary to prevent the employee from escaping and compel him
to perform the contract; that in the contemplation of the law the
compulsion to such service by the fear of punishment under a criminal statute is more powerful than any guard which the employer
could station; that therefore the state cannot avail itself of the sanction of the criminal law to supply the compulsion.
It is not true as a general proposition that the annexation by law
of disagreeable consequences to a breach of contract for personal ser-
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vices is the establishment of involuntary servitude.
The law has
always permitted an action for damages for a breach of such a contract and the effect of this principle is to deter men from breaking,
and to constrain them to perform their contracts. The exercise by
the law of this sort of pressure upon the contracting party has never
been held to be a subjection of him to servitude.
Why should the law distinguish between the coercion resulting
from the liability to an action for damages and the coercion resulting
from the liability to a prosecution and fine and imprisonment?
The distinction is not based upon the fact that in one case the
pressure is applied by the civil, and in the other by the criminal
courts. Courts of equity have refused to decree specific performance
of contracts for personal services under a threat of punishment by
fine or imprisonment for disobedience to their decrees, because to do
so would be to create involuntary servitude.
The distinction is evidently based upon the degree of the compulsiveness of the consequences annexed by law to non-performance.
But since in some cases a person may prefer to suffer imprisonment
or to pay a fine rather than to pay damages, a criminalization of the
breach of contract would be less an establishment of involuntary servitude than the subjection of the violator to a liability for damages.
Perhaps it is the degree of compulsiveness furnished by the joint operation of the two forms of coercion which the law fears and condemns.
The effect of the decision in this case is virtually that the legislature cannot make criminal the violation of any contract. The performance of any contract implies the employment of a man's mental and physical powers in a certain manner, which is inconsistent
with their employment at the same time in another manner.
Judgment affirmed.

PALMER v. BRACKETT
Sale-Contract to Sell-Uniform Sales Act-Uniform Bills of Lading Act-Damages.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Brackett ordered ten bushels of potatoes of a certain quality,
the bushel having a certain weight. The potatoes were separated by
Palmer from the stock on hand, put in bags and delivered to a
railroad company.
The bill of lading, made out in the name of
Brackett, was sent to him. When the potatoes arrived, Brackett,
expecting them, found, as he alleged, that they did not correspond
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with the description of the potatoes ordered in quality and weight.
He refused therefore to receive them. The railroad company sold
them for freight, tending the surplus of the proceeds, after deducting the freight, first to Brackett, then to Palmer; both refused to
receive it. This is an -action for damages for Brackett's non-performance of the contract. The court allowed the jury to decide
whether the potatoes agreed with the description, and if they did,
instructed the jury that the contract price could be recovered by
Palmer, and if they did not, that nothing could be recovered. Verdict for Palmer. Motion for a new trial.
Burd, for plaintiff.
Bisbing, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FISHER, J. As the jury found that the potatoes agreed with
the description, the question of warranty does not enter into the
case. And it is a well settled principle that a common carrier
has a lien on the goods for the charge of transportation. 6 Cyc.
501. The grounds for a new trial are that the Court erred in its
charge to the jury regarding the amount of damages to be recovered
by Palmer.
The present tendency of American cases is to the doctrine that
where the vendor stands in the attitude of complete performance
on his part, he is entitled to the contract price as his measure of
damages; on an executory contract for the sale of goods not specific,
the measure of damages for a refusal to receive them is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the day
Unexcelled Fire-works Co. v. Polites, 130
appointed for delivery.
Pa. 536; Edson v. Magee, 43 Sup. 297; Webb v. Hosiery Co., 231
Pa. 297; Zeller v. Haupt, 41 Sup. 647. The amount of damages
therefore depends upon whether the transaction between Palmer
and Brackett was a sale or a contract to sell; that is, whether the
title to the'property passed.
Where a sale of goods has been made, it is plain the measure of damages for non-payment is the stipulated price. BalIentine v. Robinson, 46 Pa. 177. About that there is no doubt. Doubts,
however, have been entertained where goods have been sold and
not delivered in consequence of the refusal of the buyer to complete the contract. It has ,sometimes been said that the standard
for measurement is the excess of the contract price over the market value. "Yet where the subject of the same is a specific article,
where the contract has been so far completed as to pass the property in the article to the vendee, the possession being only retained
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because the price has not been paid, there seems to be no good
reason why the vendor should not be permitted to recover the
agreed value. He has fully complied with all that he was under
obligations to do. He has parted with his property and given the
full equivalent for the stipulated price. His right to the property
having passed to the vendee, his right to 'the price would appear
to be consummate. This marks the distinction as to the measure
In case where the default is in connection with an
of damages.
executed contract, and where it is in connection with a simple contract to sell: in the latter the measure of damages is determined by
the general rule of difference between contract price and market
value; in the former the contract price is the measure." Henderson
v. Jennings, 228 Pa. 188. It was held in that case that where there
is a sale of goods generally, a delivery is necessary to pass title;
but the very appropriation of the article to the contract is equivalent
to delivery by the vendor, and that the effect of the contract is to
vest the property in the bargainee, and that if there is a breach
the measure of damages is the stipulated contract price, and not
the excess of the contract price over the market value at the time
of delivery.
There is no doubt that title passed in the present case. It has
been held that the title passes when the goods are set apart and
charged to the purchaser or vendee. Comm. v. Hess, 148 Pa. 98;
Comm. v. Guinzbury, 46 Sup. 488. But in some cases a delivery has
been held necessary; there was a delivery in the case at bar, for delivery to a common carrier is delivery to the purchaser. Garbracht
v. Comm., 96 Pa. 449. "Though the buyer does not request it, if the
seller consigns the goods to the buyer, the carrier is the buyer's lawful agent."
16 Dickinson Law Review 89. This doctrine is made
part of the sales act of 1915, in Section 46: "Where, in pursuance of
a contract to sell or a sale, the seller is authorized or required to send
the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether
named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the
buyer is deemed to be a delivery of goods to a certain point.
In Section 18 of the Sales Act a provision tending toward the
same end reads: "Where there is a contract to sell specific goods, the
property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred." Section 19, whicb
provides rules for ascertaining the intention, states: "Where, in pursuance of a contract to sell, the seller delivers the goods to the buyer
or to a carrier or other ballee (whether named by the buyer or not)
for the purpose of transmitting to or holding for the buyer, he is
presumed to have unconditionally appropriated the goods to the contract, except in the cases" where the seller agrees to deliver the goods
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to a certain point, or expressly reserves the title in himself, neither
of which conditions exists in the present case.
Another matter which indicates a sale in the present case is the
Bill of Lading made out in the name of the vendee and sent to him.
Mitchell v. Baker, 208 Pa. 377, holds that where, under a contract of
sale, the goods sold are shipped by the seller to the purchaser, and
the bill of lading is made out in the name of the seller who endorses
it over to the purchaser, the title of goods upon delivery to the carrier and upon the endorsement of the bill of lading passes to the purchaser."
As a Bill of Lading endorsed by the seller to the buyer
passes title, it is very evident that one made out in the name of the
vendee by the seller would pass title to the goods.
This is provided for in Section 40 of the Bills of Lading Act,
which reads: "Where by the bill the goods are deliverable to the
buyer or his agent, or to the order of the buyer or his agent, the consignor thereby transfers the property in the goods to the buyer."
As title to the goods has passed, we do not find any error in the
charge of the court below that the full contract price could be recovered, as has been shown by cases above cited, holding ttat when
title has passed, the measure of damages for non-acceptance by the
buyer is the full contract price.
This case is not covered by Section 64 of the sales act, as claimed by the appellant, as that section applies only to contracts to sell
and not to sales, according to the explanation of it by Prof. Williston,
its author. Section 63, No. (3) states: "Although the property in the
goods has not passed, * * * * * if the provisions of Section 64 are not
applicable;" this shows that Section 64 is only applicable to contracts
to sell.
Section 63 provides: (1) "Where, under a contract to sell or a
sale, the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and the
buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according
to the terms of the contract or sale, the seller may maintain an action
against him for the price of the goods. This section of the act applies to the present case, for the title has passed, and the act does
not require an acceptance by the buyer. "If the buyer wrongfully refuses to take title when offered him, according to the weight of authority the seller may recover the full purchase price." Williston on
Sales, page 943, construing this section of the act, citing Ballentine
v. Robinson, 46 Pa. 177; and Reynolds v. Callender, 19 Sup. 610.
As the measure of damages under the old law and under the
Sales Act of 1915 is the full contract price when title has passed to
the purchaser, and as title has passed in this case, the motion for a
new trial must accordingly be dismissed, and judgment of the lower
court affirmed.
Motion dismissed.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The able opinion of the learned court below makes an extended
discussion of this case by us unnecessary.
Potatoes, described, with respect to weight and quality, were ordered by the defendant, who did not see them. The plaintiff selected
potatoes, and sent them by common carrier, to the defendant, transmitting to the latter likewise, a bill of lading. If the potatoes correspond with the description, the act of the vendor passed the ownership
over to the vendee. The jury has found that they did correspond with
the description.
The defendant on examination has rejected the potatoes and alleges that they vary from the description. If they did, he would have
had a right thus to reject them. But, the jury has found that they
did not vary. There was no right of rejection. The potatoes having
become Brackett's, he must pay the price. This is an action for the
price.
Had the plaintiff acquiesced in the rejection by receiving
them, he could not have recovered the price. Something else would
be the measure of damages. Palmer has refused to acquiesce in the
rejection. He must then recover the price.
The railroad company has sold the potatoes for the freight, but
it has tendered the excess of price beyond the charges to the defendant. It will hold that excess subject to his demand.
A case somewhat like the present is Chemical Co. v. Eberts Co.,
Incorporated, 59 Super. 295.
Affirmed.

